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Berner et a Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr alleges that CA9 erred in reversing 
the DC's dismissal of a suit brought by recipients of inside in-
( 
l 
formation against the tipsters. CA9 held that the doctrine of in 
@ri delicto did not apply to shield securities professionals and 
corporate officers from the consequences of their fraudulent rnis-
representations. ____ ___,. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resps received what they 
-;:::::::;::=-
believed to be material inside information regarding a mining 
venture by the T.O.N.M. Corp. They proceeded to buy this corp.'s 
stock on the open market in anticipation of large profits. Resps 
apparently bought the stock at approximately $1.50/share. The 
market price eventually rose to $7.00/share. Subsequently, the 
corporation announced that the mining venture would not go for-
ward and the price of its stock fell to under $1.00/share. 
Resps then filed suit under §lO(b) of the Securities 
/ Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5. The defendants (now petrs) were one 
~ Charles Lazzaro, a registered broker, and one Leslie Neadeau, 
President of T.O.N.M .• Resps alleged that the two conspired to 
manipulate the market price of T.O.N.M. stock by disseminating 
false information on the pretext that it was inside information. 
Lazzaro allegedly induced resps to buy T.O.N.M. stock by telling 
them that he knew Neadeau personally and had inside information 
an the mining venture. When resps sought to confirm Lazzaro's 
information by calling Neadeau, he allegedly would neither con-
firm nor deny it, but said that the information was "not public 
knowledge" and that Lazarro was a "trustworthy and good man." 
The DC dismissed the suit on the ground that resps were 
m pari delicto with Lazarro and Neadeau. Noting that the corn-
plaint admitted resps' reliance on inside information, the DC 
held that the suit was automatically barred. CA9 reversed. · It 
noted that this Court has not considered the application of the 
m pari delicto defense as an absolute bar to private actions 
under the federal securities statutes, and that it has not ap-
Plied the doctrine in private antitrust actions. Perma Life Muf-
flers v. International Parts Corp., 392 u.s. 134 (1968). More-
over, CA9 reasoned that if the facts alleged in the complaint 
were true, the investors could not possibly be equally at fault 
with petrs. Protection of the investing public is the goal of 
the Securities Exchange Act, and this legislative purpose would 
be hindered by sanctioning the investors in this case. Finally, 
~9 recognized that its decision conflicted with that in Tarasi 
v. Pittsburgh National Bank, SSS F.2d 11S2 (CA3), cert. denied, 
434 u.s. 96S (1977) and Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 
(CAS 1969) • 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that CA9 erred in refus-
ing to apply the doctrine of in pari delicto to dismiss resps' 
suit. Given the conflict in the circuits on this question, the 
Court should take the case to ensure uniform treatment of tippers 
in actions brought against tippees. 
4. DISCUSSION: As CA9 recognized, its decision square-
ly conflicts with those of CAS and CA3. This conflict has re-
sulted as the CAs have attempted to follow this Court's reasoning 
in Perma Life Mufflers. 
Although CA9's view of Perma Life Mufflers was reason-
able, I don't think that case necessarily leads to CA9's result. 
In Perma Life, the Court held that the common law doctrine of in 
pa':je 't. 
pari delicto was not a defense to a private antitrust action. 
The Court ' reasoned that "the purposes of the antitrust laws are 
best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-
present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in 
violation of the antitrust laws." 392 u.s., at 139. Accordingly, 
it allowed plaintiffs to challenge a number of restraints of 
trade, even though as dealers of the defendants' merchandise they 
had agreed to these restrictive practices. There were five opin-
ions in this case, all which supported the Court's judgment at 
least in part. 
CA3 in Tarasi, supra, thought Perma Life did not bar 
the defense of in pari delicto in a tipper/tippee situation such 
as that here, because "Perma Life emphasized the fact that the 
participation by the plaintiffs in the unlawful agreement was 
passive, and perhaps coerced." In these circumstances, the ap-
plication of the in pari delicto doctrine would not deter future 
violations, while the application of the treble damages remedy of 
the antitrust laws would. CA3 thought that the case of a tippee 
acting on false "inside information" was distinguishable. In 
such a case, the application of the doctrine would deter the use 
of the information: if the doctrine did not apply, a tippee would 
have less incentive not to use the information since he might 
have recourse against the tipper if the information proved false. 
Jccord, Kuehnert, supra. 
Other circuits, most notably CA2, have decisions going 
both ways on this question. See Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 
F.2d 68, 76 (1980}, cert. denied, 449 u.s. 1123 (listing cases}. 
·· ... .. .- '"" ·• '"' ..... ,. .. , ~· ""' -· • "" · "' r • • 1 • .. 
- · - .- - - - II -- ........ .&;; .t ); page ;;) • 
These decisions have weighed the public policy interests in en-
forcing the securities statutes against the policy served by not 
letting a wrongdoer profit by his actions. In so doing, they 
considered the relative fault of the parties on the particular 
facts of these cases. 
The issue presented by this petition is important and 
recurring, and the CAs have decided it in conflicting ways. 
~-------------- -------··· 
Thus, I recommend calling for a response. 1 
5. RECOMMENDATION: 1 recommen~ 
There is no response. 
December 5, 1984 Levins Opin in petn 
aml 1/3/85 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Annmarie 
Re: No. 84-679, Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards v. Berner et al 
The petition seeks review of CA9's holding that the doctrine of 
in pari delicto does not apply to shield securities professionals 
and corporate officers from liability for fraudulent tips. You 
called for a response, which has been received. 
The response is very good, arguing strenuously that there is no 
real conflict and that the CA9's holding makes good sense. It is 
very persuasive, and I think it may be possible to read CA9's 
decision as only minimally in conflict with the decisions of CA3 
and CAS. Still, I think there is some conflict, and that this 
Court's fragmented decision in Perma Life Mufflers will continue 
to generate conflict. Thus, I would join three to grant. 
Court ................... . ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued . .. ................ , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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ABSENT NOT YOTING 
April 2, 1985 
BATEMAN GINA-POW 
84-679 Bateman Eichler, et al. v. Berner, et al. (CA9} 
MEMO TO FILE 
This case was granted to resolve a conflict among the 
circuits. The decision of CA9 appears to stand alone, 
contrary to decisions by CA3, 5 and 11. 
The respondents (sometimes referred to as plaintiffs} 
filled a complaint under §105-B of the Securities Act 
alleging that Charles Lazzaro, a registered broker 
employed by petitioner in this case (defendant in the 
suit}, and Leslie Neadeau, president of T.O.N.M. Oil and 
Gas Exploration Corp. (TONM or the company}, conspired to 
defraud them by making misrepresentations that induced 
them to purchase T.O.N.M. stock. The complaint alleges 
that Lazzaro, in order to induce them to purchase the 
stock, represented that the company had found gold in 
Surinam; that the company would announce a joint-venture 
with St. Josephs Mining and Mineral Company to mine the 
gold; and that the value of the company's stock would rise 
dramatically as a result of these developments. 
Plaintiffs purchased the stock "on the premise" that 
Lazzaro's information was "not information available to 
2. 
the general public". The plaintiffs bought a substantial 
amount of stock without disclosing that they had inside 
information. The market price rose from $1.50 to $7.00 
per share. But the price fell to $1.00 per share when no 
joint-venture resulted and the company announced that 
there would be none. 
In short, this is a suit by admitted tippees against 
their alleged tippers, action by both plaintiffs and 
defendants that violates the Securities Law. The 
defendant (petitioner here), a large brokerage firm in 
California, moved to dismiss on the ground that the 
tippees were in pari delicto with the tippers (namely, the 
broker Lazzaro and the president of TONM Company. 
Apparently the complaint sets forth all the facts 
necessary to an in pari delicto defense, provided such 
defense is available in a suit under the Securities Acts. 
More specifically, Lazzaro is alleged to have induced 
plaintiffs to purchase the stock by telling them that he 
knew the company's president personally, that he had 
learned the non-public information from the company's 
officers, and that the stock would increase dramatically 
when the joint-venture was announced. Plaintiffs got in 
3. 
' . 
touch with Neadeau to varify the accuracy of the "tips. 
Although Neadeau would neither confirm nor deny the 
accuracy, he volunteered that such information was "not 
public knowledge" and that Lazzaro was "very trustworthy 
and a good man". 
Accepting allegations of the complaint as true on the 
motion to dismiss, the DC - relying on decisions from the 
3rd and 5th Circuits - held that in lOB-S actions for 
alleged fraud in connection with the use of insider 
information, tippees are barred by the doctrine of in pari 
delicto from suing the tipper. The District Court 
concluded: 
"There is no question that if the 
allegations of the complaint are true, both 
plaintiffs and defendants violated the 
particular statutory provision under which 
recovery is sought (in this suit) • 
The Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed, 
concluding that "a duped investor is not equally at fault 
in the fraud purpotrated against him by his broker or an 
insider"; that the doctrine in pari dilecto generally 
requires equal fault on both sides; and may not apply at 
all to a suit under the Securities Act. The court 
4. 
recognized that its decision conflicted with that of other 
circuit courts of appeals. CA9 relied on this Court's 
decision in Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 u.s. 134, that involved a private antitrust 
action, a case in which the Court held that the doctrine 
of in pari dilecto did not apply to a private antitrust 
action. 
The foregoing is not a complete summary of this case. 
Nor have I discussed the relevance of various provisions 
of the Securities Act. I am inclined to think that the 
common law doctrine of in pari dilecto should be available 
as a defense when the tippee and the tipper each 
admittedly violated the Federal Securities Law. I do not 
understand CA9 's reasoning that the tipper is more at 
fault than the tippee even thought the latter knew he had 
received inside information and extensively traded on it 
in violation of the law. This trading defrauded the 
persons from whom the tippees purchased the stock though 
in this case, where the tip turned out to be incorrect, 
the persons who sold their stock were fortunate. 
Having expressed these tentative views, this is a new 
question for me. I will want a summary bench memo and 
5. 
' . 
also will take a closer look at the briefs. I have read 
both of the opinions below rather carefully. 
~·· ;· 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
No. 84-6 79 
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards Inc. v. Berner 
Dan April 3, 1985 
Question Presented 
Whether an employee of a brokerage firm who in-
duces investors to purchase stock by deliberately misrepre-
senting that he is communicating material nonpublic infor-
mation about the company can avoid lOb-S liability to those 
investors on the ground that the defrauded investors were 
No. 84-6 79 page 2. 
in pari delicto with him because they purchased securities 
on the false premise that they were tippees? 
I. Background. 
Resps filed a complaint under various sections of 
the securities acts alleging that one Lazzaro, an employee 
of petr, and one Neadeau, president of T.O.N.M. Oil & Gas 
Exploration Corporation (TONM), conspired to defraud them 
by inducing them to purchase TONM stock. Specifically, 
they alleged that Lazzaro represented to them that he had 
learned from TONM' s president or vice-president, both of 
- ---- . 
whom he claimed were personal friends, that TONM had ac--
quired the rights to a large gold discovery and was prepar------
ing to mine it. Lazzaro told resps that the discovery and 
preparations were not publicly known and that the price of 
TONM's stock would rise dramatically. Resps then contacted 
Neadeau in order to verify these claims. Neadeau would 
neither confirm nor deny them. Instead, he merely stated 
that they "were not public knowledge." Neadeau was specif-
ically advised that resps were dealing with Lazzaro and he 
told them "that he could say that Lazzaro was very trust-
worthy and a good man." Resps admit in their complaint 
that they purchased the stock "on the premise that Lazzaro 
was privy to certain information not otherwise available to 
the general public." They lost their shirts when TONM an-
nounced that there would be no mining venture. 
No. 84-679 page 3. 
The DC dismissed under Rule 12(b) (6) because resps 
were in pari delicto with petr. It stated that "trading on 
insider information is itself a violation of rule lOb-S" 
and that resps had admitted in their complaint "that they 
acted on insider information (albeit false information) and 
therefore were tippees." The DC refused to assess the rel-
ative fault of the parties on the ground that "both plain-
----.A 
tiffs and defendants violated the particular statutory pro-
vision under which recovery is sought." -
The CA9 reversed. Following its rule in antitrust c/-?~ --- -
cases, it held that "the doctrine of in pari delicto does 
not apply where the facts show that the plaintiff is less 
than co-equally responsible for his injury." App. to Pet. 
for Cert. A6. It then held as a matter of law that the 
defense could not apply under the circumstances of this 
case: 
"In the matter before us, the complaint al-
leges that the fraudulent scheme was or ig ina ted 
by the broker and his coconspirators to manipu-
late the market price of T.O.N.M. stock for their 
financial benefit. The complaint further pro-
vides that the investors acted in reliance on 
these representations without knowledge of the 
true facts. The allegations of the complaint, if 
proved, would demonstrate that the investors 
could not have been equally responsible for the 
injury they suffered as a result of this fraudu-
lent scheme. Therefore, the complaint should not 
have been dismissed on the basis of in pari de-
licto." Ibid. (emphasis added). 
The CA9 then went on to discuss how allowing the defense in 
cases like this would frustrate the purposes of the securi-
ties laws. Finally, it admitted that its decision con--flicted with that reached by two other circuits: Tarasi v. 
No. 84-679 page 4. 
Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F.2d 1152 (CA3), cert. de-
nied, 434 u.s. 965 (1977), and Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 
412 F.2d 700 CAS 1969). 
II. Discussion. 
Under Penna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International 
Parts Corp., 392 u.s. 134 (1968) (holding in pari delicto 
defense unavailable in certain antitrust actions), deciding 
whether to allow an in pari delicto defense in this case ______________. 
involves three separate issues: ( i) was the resps' conduct 
culpable? (ii) was it at least as culpable as petr's 
conduct? and (iii) would allowing the defense frustrate the 
purposes of the securities laws? Only if the answer to the 
first two questions is 'yes' and that to the third is 'no' 
should the defense apply. 
Although neither party really discusses the issue, 
there is some question whether after Dirks v. SEC, 463 u.s. 
646 (1983), resps' tippee trading, as described in the corn-
plaint, actually violates the securities laws. In Dirks, 
the Court held that trading on material nonpublic inforrna-
tion without disclosure did not b~ it~~f violate the secu-
rities laws. Rather, an individual who trades OQ such in-
formation without disclosure violates the laii ong if he 
II '' violates a separate duty to disclose or abstain--a duty 
---------~ 
that may arise either from his own relationship to the corn-....___........ 
duty owed to the company b 
No. 84-679 page 5. 
the individual who gave him such information. As you wrote 
in Dirks: 
"a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the share-
holders of a corporation not to trade on material 
nonpublic information onl hen the ins· d has 
breached his fi c ·a y to the shareholders 
by disc osing the information to the tippee and 
the tippee knows or should know that there has 
been a breach." Slip op. at 13 (emphasis added). 
The question here is whether it is clear from the face of 
the complaint itself that resps knew or should have known 
that there was a breach of fiduciary duty. 
Lazzaro and Neadeau's scheme was quite clever. 
Lazzaro, a nonfiduciary, gave resps the false information 
while Neadeau, a fiduciary, never explicitly confirmed it. -
Had Neadeau not called Lazzaro "trustworthy and a good man" 
when contacted by resps for verification and had Lazzaro 
not claimed to be a personal friend of insiders in TONM, it 
would be unclear whether resps should have known there was 
a breach of fiduciary duty. I believe, however, that these 
remarks by Lazzaro and Neadeau are sufficient as a matter 
-----------~------------- ----------------------
of law to have put resps on notice that there had been a - --- ---------------------breach of fiduciary duty. Under Dirks, then, resps did 
violate the securities laws in trading on material nonpub-
lie information. 
Although resps were culpable, I do not believe 
that they were at least as culpable as petr. For one 
__________...., --
thing, the courts have traditionally considered a plain-
tiff's fault as less than a defendant's in cases where the 
1rV'? plaintiff was induced through the defendant's fraudulent 
No. 84-679 page 6. 
representations to participate in the unlawful scheme. 3 
J. Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence §942a, at 
741 (5th ed. 1941); accord National Bank & Loan Co. v. Pe-
trie, 189 u.s. 423, 425 (1903) (the "usual consequence [of 
fraud] is that as between the parties the one who is de-
frauded has a right, if possible, to be restored to his 
former position"). For another, Congress has recognized by 
imposing civil penalties on nontrading tippers in §2 of the -----
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1894, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 
§2, 98 Stat. 1264, that tippers are more responsible than 
tippees for insider trading frauds: 
"'Tippers' often obtain material nonpublic infor-
mation as a result of a position of trust and 
confidence. Absent the tipper's misconduct, the 
tippee's trading would not occur. Thus, the new 
civil penalty would be imposed upon those persons 
most directly culpable in a violation." H.R. 
Rep. 98-355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess 9 (1983) (em-
phasis added). 
Still another reason to hold tippers more culpable is that 
under Dirks they have a more direct duty to disclose or 
abstain. The tippee's duty is derivative of theirs and 
---------~---------------------
accordingly more attenuated. Finally, tipper-brokers are 
-------------------~ 
in a special position. Brokers, because of their special 
role in securities trading, have traditionally been held to 
higher standards of integrity than individual investors. 
(Witness the many special provisions in the securities laws 
governing brokers' conduct.) In fact, the only real argu-
ment petr can make for considering resps' culpability to be 
equal to its own is that resps broke the same law in the 
same scheme. By itself, however, this is usually not 
No. 84-679 page 7. 
enough to invoke the in pari delicto defense. 1 J. Story, 
Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence §300 (13th ed. 1886). 
The final issue is whether application of the in 
pari delicto defense would advance or frustrate the pur-
poses of the securities laws. I believe it would frustrate 
them for two reasons. ~, it seems to me that illegal 
tippee trading is more effectively deterred by aiming the 
sanctions at the tipper rather than the tippee. Exposing 
the tipper to liability from the tippee can stop the dis-
semination of material nonpublic information at the source. 
Insulating the tipper from such liability, on the other 
hand, removes all disincentives, except for the risk of SEC 
sanctions, for the tipper not to manipulate the market. 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether placing the risk of loss 
on the tippee would really have any deterrent effect. 
Since scienter is required under Rule lOb-S, the only addi-
----------------~ '- - . 
tional deterrent effect allowing an in pari delicto defense 
would have on tippees would arise from their fear that tip-
pers would intentionally deceive them. Because tippers, 
especially broker-tippers, usually occupy a position of 
trust relative to the tippee, this additional deterrence 
would probably be minimal. 
Second, disallowing the in pari delicto defense 
would lead to better exposure of frauds perpetrated on the 
public. If tippers can claim the defense, there is no in-
centive for tippees to sue them and bring frauds to light. 
Tippees would have little to gain by exposing the fraud and 
No. 84-679 page 8. 
could lose much by exposing their own potentially illegal 
conduct. Thus, allowing the defense would hinder exposure 
of a type of fraud that would otherwise seem to be very 
difficult to detect. Such a result would frustrate not 
only SEC enforcement but also private actions by other in-
dividual investors who may have been defrauded through no 
fault of their own. Letting frauds easily surface to pub-
lic knowledge would strongly further the purposes of the 
securities laws. 
Recommendation 
I recommend affirming the judgment of the CA9. 
~;;. ~ ~~--~r ¥/~ -z.~R' 
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From: Justice Brennan 
Circulated: MAY 2 1 1985 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-679 
BATEMAN EICHLER, HILL RICHARDS, 
INCORPORATED, PETITIONER v. 
CARL F. BERNER ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1985] 
JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented by this case is whether the com-
mon-law in ari delicto defense bars a r1va e ama es 
action under the e era securities laws against coryorate 
insfde.rs ana broker-dealers who traudufentl i a e inves-
tQi;"- ies by niiSrepresenting that they are 
conveying material nonpublic information about the issuer. 
I 
The respondent investors filed this action in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California, 
alleging that they incurred substantial trading losses as a 
result of a conspiracy between Charles Lazzaro, a registered 
securities broker employed by the petitioner Bateman 
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. (Bateman Eichler), and Leslie 
Neadeau, President ofT. 0. N. M. Oil & Gas Exploration 
Corporation (TONM), to induce them to purchase large quan-
tities of TONM over-the-counter stock by divulging false and 
materially incomplete information about the company on the 
pretext that it was accurate inside information. 1 Specifi-
1 The investors named Lazzaro, Neadeau, TONM, and Bateman Eichler 
as defendants. Complaint ~~5-8, App. 7-8. The investors charged that 
Neadeau and TONM had "directly and indirectly participated with, aided 
and abetted, and conspired with" Lazzaro in the scheme. Id. ~9, App. 8; 
is '-'\ v~;d". t-1./ <MI j reservJI!ho 
; .., .. Lc l J"' d; '-'" 8 't'"'vu:." a f r w. r5 to Oc fP ~ 1L 
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cally, Lazzaro is all,egeg to have told the respondents that he 
personally knew TONM insiders and had learned, inter alia, 
that (a) "[ v ]ast amounts of gold had been discovered in Suri-
nam, and TONM had options on thousands of acres in gold-
producing regions of Surinam"; 2 (b) the discovery was "not 
publicly known, but would subsequently be announced"; (c) 
TONM was currently engaged in negotiations with other 
c;ompanies to form a joint venture for mining the Surinamese 
gold; and (d) when this information was made public, "TONM 
stock, which was then selling from $1.50 to $3.00/share, 
would increase in value from $10 to $15/share within a short · 
period of time and ... might increase to $100/share" within 
a year. omplamt ~~16-17, App. 10-12.3 Some of the 
respond en s contac ed N eadeau and inquired whether Laz-
zaro's tips were accurate; Neadeau stated that the informa-
tion was "not public knowledge" and "would neither confirm 
see also id. 1140, App. 17. Bateman Eichler's liability was premised on its 
status as a "controlling person" of Lazzaro within the meaning of § 20(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 899, 15 U. S. C. § 78t(a). 
Complaint 11115, 39, App. 7, 16-17. Seen. 26, infra. 
Although Lazzaro, Neadeau, and TONM also are respondents in this 
Court, see Sup. Ct. Rule 19.6, we shall use "respondents" to refer exclu-
sively to the investor plaintiffs, who are defending the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this Court. 
2 Gold exploration has been conducted in Surinam for more than 100 
years, but production has declined dramatically since early in this century. 
Complaint 1111, App. 9. The areas in which TONM had been engaged in 
exploration "were historically mined by Surinamese natives using 
primative methods," and were accessible to the outside world "primarily 
by motorized canoes and helicopter." !d. 1112, App. 9. Lazzaro allegedly 
told the investors that TONM's discovery "compared favorably to, if not 
better than, those in South Africa," and that development "would not 
require deep mining" because "(g]eologists in Surinam were finding gold 
nuggets in dry creek beds." Id. 1116, App. 11. 
3 Lazzar~lso ~dly told the investors that, after the announcement, 
TONM s areho ers "would automatically receive" additional stock in 
TONM's subsidiary, International Gold ·and Diamond Exploration Corp., 
Inc., "without the payment of any additional monies." Ibid. (emphasis in 
original). 
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nor deny those claims," but allegedly advised that "Lazzaro 
was a very trustworthy and a good man." !d. ~ 19, App. 12. 
The respondents admitted in their com laint that they pur-
chased TONM stock, muc o 1t through Lazzaro, "on the 
premise that Lazzaro was privy to certain information not 
otherwise available to the general public." !d. ~ 15, App. 10. 
Their shares initially increased dramatically in price, but ul-
timately declined to substantially below the purchase price 
when the joint mining venture fell through. Id. ~~22-26, 
App. 13-14.4 
Lazzaro and Neadeau ar~to have made the repre- · 
sentations set forth above knowing that the representations 
"were untrue and/or contained only half-truths, material 
omissions of fact and falsehoods,'' 5 intending that the re-
spondents would rely thereon, and for the purpose of "influ-
enc[ing] and manipulat[ing] the price of TONM stock" so as 
"to profit themselves through the taking of commissions and 
secret profits." Id. ~~23, 30, 38, App. 13, 15-16.6 There-
• The respondents purchased the stock in late 1979 and early 1980 for 
between $1.50 and $3.00 per share, and the price of the stock rose to $7.00 
per share by the fourth quarter of 1980. !d. ~ 22, App. 13. "[S]ome or 
all" of the respondents claim to have told Lazzaro at this time that they 
wanted to sell their shares, but "Lazzaro stated that he would let the plain-
tiffs know when to sell the TONM stock, and that they should not sell just 
because the stock had reached $7.00/share because it would go higher still." 
Ibid. The stock then plummeted "to approximately $1.00 per share" by 
the end of 1980, and fell to "less than $1.00 a share" early the next year. 
!d. ~~ 24-25, App. 14. 
5 In the alternative, Lazzaro and Neadeau are alleged to have made 
these representations "recklessly with wanton disregard for the truth." 
!d. ~ 32, App. 15. 
6 Neadeau is alleged to have owned approximately 100,000 shares of the 
outstanding common stock of TONM, and Lazzaro is alleged to have "con-
trolled over a million shares of TONM stock through stocks purchased by 
himself and his clients." !d. ~~ 8, 23, App. 8, 13. See also id. ~ 16, App. 
12 ("Lazzaro and his relatives owned a large block of TONM stock"). The 
investors charged that "Lazzaro could thereby and did influence and 
manipulate the price of TONM stock through purchases and sales thereof, 
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spondents contended that this scheme violated, inter alia, 
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 
15 U. S.C. §78j(b), 7 and SEC Rule 10b--5 promulgated 
thereunder, 17 CFR § 240.10b--5 (1984). 8 They sought capi-
tal losses and lost profits, punitive damages, and costs and 
attorney's fees. App. ~26:..:._9 ----------, 
The District Court ismissed the complai for failure to 
state a claim. The cou reasoned t at rading on insider 
information is itself a violation of rule 10b--5" and that the 
and through the dissemination of false infonnation to plaintiffs and others." 
ld. 1123, App. 13. 
7 That section provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange-
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
8 That rule provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 
9 In addition, the respondents sought recovery pursuant to § 17(a) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77q(a), see 
Complaint 111148-50, App. 20, which the parties and the courts below have 
treated as comparable to § 10(b) for purposes of applying the in pari delicto 
defense. We express no view as to whether a private right of action exists 
under § 17(a). Compare Keys v. Wolfe, 709 F. 2d 413, 416 (CA5 1983), 
with Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd. , 652 F. 2d 808, 815 (CA9 
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allegations in the complaint demonstrated that the respond-
ents themselves had "violated the particular provision under 
which recovery is sought." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. 
Thus, the court concluded, the respondents were in pari de-
licto with Lazzaro and N eadeau and absolutely barred from 
recovery. Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 730 
F. 2d 1319 (1984). Although it assumed that the respond-
ents had violated the federal securities laws, id., at 1324, the 
court nevertheless concluded that "securities professionals . 
and corporate officers who have allegedly engaged in fraud 
should not be permitted to invoke the in pari delicto doctrine 
to shield themselves from the consequences of their fraudu-
lent misrepresentation," id., at 1320. The Court of Appeals 
noted that this Court had sharply restricted the availability 
of the in pari delicto defense in antitrust actions, see Perma 
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 
134 (1968), and concluded that, essentially for three reasons, 
there was no basis "for creating a different rule for private 
actions initiated under the federal securities laws," 730 F. 2d, 
at 1322. First, the court reasoned that, in cases such as this, 
defrauded tippees are not in fact "equally responsible" for the 
violations they allege. I d., at 1322. Second, the court be-
lieved that allowing the defense in these circumstances would 
be "totally incompatible with the overall aims of the securi-
ties law" because the threat of a private damages action is 
necessary to deter "insider-tipster[s]" from defrauding the 
public. Id., at 1323. Finally, the court noted the avail-
ability of means other than an outright preclusion of suit to 
deter tip pees from trading on inside information. I d., at 
1324, n. 3. 
The lower courts have divided over the proper scope of the 
1981). The respondents also alleged various other federal claims and 
pendent state-law claims that are not before us. 
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in pari delicto defense in securities litigation. 10 We granted 
certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1985). We affirm. 
II 
The common-law defense at issue in this case derives from 
the Latin, in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis: "in a 
case of equal fault the position of the defending party is the 
better one." 11 The defense is grounded on two premises: 
first, that courts should not lend their good offices to mediat-
ing disputes among wrongdoers; 12 and second, that denying 
'
0 See, e. g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d 1152 (CA3) 
(allowing defense), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 965 (1977); Malamphy v. Real-
Tex Enterprises, Inc., 527 F. 2d 978 (CA4 1975) (per curiam) (sustaining 
submission of defense to jury); Woolf v. SD Cohn & Co., 515 F. 2d 591, 
601-605 (CA5 1975) (rejecting defense on facts of case), on reh'g, 521 F. 2d 
225, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 426 U. S. 944 (1976); 
Keuhnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F. 2d 700 (CA5 1969) (allowing defense); 
Kirkland v. E. F . Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 433-437 (ED Mich. 
1983) (rejecting defense on motion for summary judgment); Grumet v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336 (NJ 1983) (allowing 
defense); Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 882, 
884-887 (SD Fla. 1981) (rejecting defense on motion to dismiss); Moholt v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451 (DC 1979) (rejecting defense 
on motion for summary judgment); In re Haven Industries, Inc ., 462 F . 
Supp. 172, 177-180 (SDNY 1978) (allowing defense); Nathanson v. Weis, 
Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (SDNY 1971) (rejecting defense); 
Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F. R. D. 89 (SDNY 1970) (denying motion to 
strike defense). Cf. Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 
710 F. 2d 678, 691 (CA111983); Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F. 2d 68, 
76 (CA21980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1123 (1981); Can-Am Petroleum Co. 
v. Beck, 331 F. 2d 371, 373 (CAlO 1964). 
11 Black's Law Dictionary 711 (rev. 5th ed. 1977). 
12 See, e. g., Higgins v. McCrea, 116 U. S. 671, 685 (1886); Austin's 
Adm'x v. Winston's Ex'r, 11 Va. 33, 47 (1806) ("He who comes here for 
relief must draw his justice from pure fountains"). See also Holman v. 
Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K. B. 1775): 
"The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and 
defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is 
not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed . . . . The 
principle of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non oritur actio [out of fraud 
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judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means 
of deterring illegality. 13 In its classic formulation, the in 
pari delicto defense was narrowly limited to situations where 
the plaintiff truly bore at least equal responsibility for his 
injury, because "in cases where both parties are in delicto, 
concurring in an illegal act, it does not always follow that 
they stand in pari delicto; for there may be, and often are, 
very different degrees in their guilt." 1 J. Story, Com-
mentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 304-305 (1886) (Story). 
Thus there might be an "inequality of condition" between the 
parties, id., at 305, or "a confidential relationship between . 
th[em]" that determined their "relative standing" before a 
court, 3 J. Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence 
§ 942a, at 741 (5th ed. 1941) (Pomeroy). In addition, the 
public policy considerations that undergirded the in pari de-
licto defense were frequently construed as precluding the de-
fense even where the plaintiff bore substantial fault for his 
injury: "there may be on the part of the court itself a neces-
sity of supporting the public interests or public policy in 
many cases, however reprehensible the acts of the parties 
may be." 1 Story 305. Notwithstanding these traditional 
limitations, many courts have given the in pari delicto de-
fense a broad application to bar actions where plaintiffs sim-
ply have been involved generally in "the same sort of wrong-
doing" as defendants. · Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. 
no action arises] . . . . It is upon that ground the Court goes; not for the 
sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a 
plaintiff." 
'
8 See, e. g., McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669-670 (1898): 
"To refuse to grant either party to an illegal contract judicial aid for the 
enforcement of his alleged rights under it tends strongly towards reducing 
the number of such transactions to a minimum. The more plainly parties 
understand that when they enter into contracts of this nature they place 
themselves outside the protection of the law, so far as that protection con-
sists in aiding them to enforce such contracts, the less inclined will they be 
to enter into them. In that way the public secures the benefit of a rigid 
adherence to the law." 
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International Parts Corp., 392 U. S., at 138. 14 
In Perma Life, we emphasized "the inappropriateness of 
invoking broad common-law barriers to relief where a private 
suit serves important public purposes." 392 U. S., at 138. 
That case involved a treble-damages action against a Midas 
Muffler franchisor by several of its dealers, who alleged that 
the franchise agreement created a conspiracy to restrain 
trade in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 15 The 
lower courts barred the action on the grounds that the deal-
ers, as parties to the agreement, were in pari delicto with 
the franchisor. In reversing that determination, the opinion · 
for this Court emphasized that there was no indication that 
Congress had intended to incorporate the defense into the 
antitrust laws, which "are best served by insuring that the 
private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone 
contemplating [illegal] business behavior." Id., at 139. Ac-
cordingly, the opinion concluded that "the doctrine of in pari 
delicto, with its complex scope, contents, and effects, is not 
to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action." I d., at 
140. The opinion reserved the question whether a plaintiff 
who engaged in "truly complete involvement and participa-
tion in a monopolistic scheme"-one who "aggressively sup-
port[ed] and further[ed] the monopolistic scheme as a neces-
sary part and parcel of it" -could be barred from pursuing a 
damages action, finding that the muffler dealers had rela-
tively little bargaining power and that they had been coerced 
by the franchisor into agreeing to many of the contract's pro-
visions. Ibid. 
In separate opinions, five Justices agreed that the concept 
of "equal fault" should be narrowly defined in litigation aris-
14 See also Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d, at 1157; L. 
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 1197 (1983); Comment, Avail-
ability of an In Pari Delicto Defense in Rule 10b-5 Tippee Suits, 77 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1084, 1086, n. 15 (1977). 
!&Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 et seq., as amended, 15 U.S. C.§ 1 et seq.; 
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 et seq., as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 12 et seq. 
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ing under federal regulatory statutes. 16 "[B]ecause of the 
strong public interest in eliminating restraints on compe-
tition, . . . many of the refinements of moral worth demanded 
of plaintiffs by ... many of the variations of in pari delicto 
should not be applicable in the antitrust field." Id., at 151 
(MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). The five Justices con-
cluded, however, that where a plaintiff truly bore at least 
substantially equal responsibility for the violation, a defense 
based on such fault-whether or not denominated in pari de-
licto-should be recognized in antitrust litigation. 17 
Bateman Eichler argues that Perma Life-with its empha- · 
sis on the importance of analyzing the effects that fault-based 
defenses would have on the enforcement of congressional 
goals-is of only marginal relevance to a private damages ac-
tion under the federal securities laws. Specifically, Bateman 
Eichler observes that Congress expressly provided for pri-
vate antitrust actions-thereby manifesting a "desire to go 
beyond the common law in the antitrust statute in order to 
provide substantial encouragement to private enforcement 
and to help deter anticompetitive conduct"-whereas private 
rights of action under§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 are merely implied from that provision 18-thereby, 
16 See 392 U.S., at 145 (WHITE, J., concurring); id., at 147-148 (Fortas, 
J., concurring in result); id., at 148-149, 151 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in 
result); id., at 154-155 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
17 JUSTICE WHITE concluded that "the in pari delicto defense in its his-
toric fonnulation is not a useful concept" in antitrust law, but emphasized 
that he "would deny recovery where plaintiff and defendant bear substan-
tially equal responsibility for injury resulting to one of them." I d., at 143, 
146. The other four Justices would have allowed explicit, though limited, 
use of the in pari delicto defense itself. I d., at 14 7 (Fortas, J., concurring 
in result); id., at 148-149 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result); id., at 153 
(Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
'
8 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 
(1975); Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S. 
6, 13, n. 9 (1971). 
' . 
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apparently, supporting a broader application of the in pari 
delicto defense. Brief for Petitioner 32. Bateman Eichler 
buttresses this argument by observing that, unlike the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts, the securities laws contain savings 
provisions directing that "[t]he rights and remedies provided 
by [those laws] shall be in addition to any and all other rights 
and remedies that may exist at law or in equity" 19-again, 
apparently, supporting a broader scope for fault-based de-
fenses than recognized in Perma Life. 
We disagree. Nothing in Perma Life suggested that pub-
lic policy implications should govern only where Congress ex-
pressly provides for private remedies; the classic formulation 
of the in pari delicto doctrine itself required a careful consid-
eration of such implications before allowing the defense. See 
supra, at--. Moreover, we repeatedly have emphasized 
that implied private actions provide "a most effective weapon 
in the enforcement" of the securities laws and are "a neces-
sary supplement to Commission action." J. I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 432 (1964); see also Blue Chip Stamps 
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730 (1975). In addi-
tion, we have eschewed rigid common-law barriers in con-
struing the securities laws. See, e. g., Herman & MacLean 
v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 388-389 (1983) (common-law 
doctrines are sometimes of "questionable pertinence" in ap-
plying the securities laws, which were intended "to rectify 
perceived deficiencies in the available common-law protec-
tions by establishing higher standards of conduct in the 
securities industry"); A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene 
Mines Corp., 312 U. S. 38, 43 (1941) (rejecting the unclean-
hands defense on the facts of the case because it would "seri-
ously hinder rather than aid the real purpose" of the securi-
11 See § 16 of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, 15 U. S. C. § 77p; 
§ 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 903, as amended, 15 
U. S. C. § 78bb(a). 
' . 
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ties laws). 20 We therefore conclude that the principles of 
Perma Life apply with full force to implied causes of action 
under the federal securities laws. Accordingly, a private 
action for damages in these circumstances may be barred on 
the grounds of the plaintiff's own culpability only where (1) as 
a direct result of his own actions, the plaintiff bears at least 
substantially equal responsibility for the violations he seeks 
to redress, and (2) preclusion of recovery would be more con-
sistent with the effective enforcement of the securities laws 
and protection of the investing public. 
A 
The District Court and Court of Appeals proceeded on the 
assumption that the respondents had violated § lO(b) and 
Rule lOb-5, see supra, at an assumption we accept for 
purposes of resolving the issue before us. Cf. A. C. Frost & 
Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Co., supra, at40-41. 21 Bateman 
20 In Frost, we quoted approvingly from an SEC memorandum arguing 
that "'it appears to us to be entirely immaterial whether in such a case, the 
agreement is labelled "void" or the parties are held to be "in pari delicto." 
There, labels, as often is the case, merely state the conclusion reached, but 
do not aid in solution of the problem. The ultimate issue is whether the 
result in the particular case would effectuate or frustrate the purposes of 
the Act."' 312 U. S., at 44, n. 2. 
21 We note, however, the inappropriateness of resolving the question of 
the respondents' fault solely on the basis of the allegations set forth in the 
complaint. A tippee generally has a duty to disclose or to abstain from 
trading on material nonpublic information only when he knows or should 
know that his insider source "has breached his fiduciary duty to the share-
holders by disclosing the information"-in other words, where the insider 
has sought to "benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." Dirks 
v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646, 660, 662 (1983). Such benefit can derive from the 
insider's use of the information to secure a "pecuniary gain," a "reputa-
tional benefit that will translate into future earnings," or simply to confer 
"a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend." I d., at 
663-664. See also id., at 655, n. 14 (alternative basis for liability where 
tippee has "entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of 
the business of the enterprise and [is] given access to information solely for 
corporate purposes"). Although the respondents certainly were aware 
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Eichler contends that the respondents' delictum was sub-
stantially par to that of Lazzaro and N eadeau for two rea-
sons. First, whereas many antitrust plaintiffs participate in 
illegal restraints of trade only "passively" or as the result of 
economic coercion, as was the case in Perma Life, the ordi-
nary tippee acts voluntarily in choosing to trade on inside 
that Lazzaro stood to gain from disclosure by the commissions he would 
earn, it is uncertain whether they had any basis to believe that Neadeau-
the insider from whose potential breach all liability flows-had violated his 
fiduciary duties to TONM's shareholders by revealing the joint-venture in-
formation to Lazzaro. The respondents might well have believed that · 
Neadeau provided the information to Lazzaro as a favor or otherwise acted 
against the shareholders' interests, but the complaint does not set forth 
sufficient facts to conclude that this was the case. 
In addition, we accept the lower courts' assumption about the respond-
ents' violations notwithstanding the uncertain character of the information 
the respondents traded on. The complaint rather strongly suggests that 
much of the information Lazzaro conveyed about the explorations and 
joint-venture negotiations was true, but that it was deceptive by virtue of 
exaggeration and the failure to include additional material information. 
See ~~ 10-12, 18, 20, 30, App. 8-9, 12-13, 15. If this was the case, and if 
the respondents otherwise acquired a derivative duty within the meaning 
of Dirks, there is no question that their trading on the basis of this informa-
tion violated the securities laws. If the information was entirely false, the 
SEC and Bateman Eichler contend that the respondents, by trading on 
what they believed was material nonpublic information, are nevertheless 
guilty of at least an attempted violation of the securities laws if they other-
wise believed that Neadeau had breached his fiduciary duties. This view 
has drawn substantial support among the lower courts. See, e. g., Tarasi 
v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d, at 1159-1160; Kuehnert v. Texstar 
Corp., 412 F. 2d, at 714; Grumet v. Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc., 564 
F. Supp., at 340. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that they 
could not have inherited any duty to disclose false information, and that the 
case is properly viewed as governed by the doctrine of legal impossibility, 
which would bar any liability, rather than factual impossibility, which 
would permit liability on an attempt theory. See also Note, The Availabil-
ity of the In Pari Delicto Defense in Tippee-Tipper Rule 10b-5 Actions 
After Dirks v. SEC, 62 Wash. U. L. Q. 519, 540-542 (1984). Because this 
issue has not been fully briefed and was not considered by the courts 
below, we express no views on it and simply proceed on the assumption 
that the respondents' activities rendered them in delicto. 
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information. Second, § 10(b) and Rule 101:>-5 apply literally 
to "any person" who violates their terms, and do not recog-
nize gradations of culpability. 
We agree that the typically voluntary nature of an inves-
tor's decision impermissibly to trade on an inside tip renders 
the investor more blameworthy than someone who is party to 
a contract solely by virtue of another's overweening bargain-
ing power. We disagree, however, that an investor who en-
gages in such trading is necessarily as blameworthy as a cor-
porate insider or broker-dealer who discloses the information 
for personal gain. Notwithstanding the broad reach of · 
§ lO(b) and Rule 101:>-5, there are important distinctions be-
tween the relative culpabillties of tip ers, securities profes-
siona s, I!_ 1 ees in these circumstances. The Court has 
made clear in recent Terms that a tippee's use of material 
nonpublic information does not violate§ 10(b) and Rule 101:>-5 
un~e tippee owes a corresEonding_ duty to disclose th~ 
i~on. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-664 (1983); 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230, n. 12 (1980). 
That duty typically is "derivative from . . . the insider's 
duty." Dirks v. SEC, supra, at 659; see also id., at 664. In 
other words, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as 
arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the in-
sider's breach of a fiduciary duty" toward corporate share-
holders. Chiarella v. United States, supra, at 230, n. 12.22 
In the context of insider trading, we do not believe that a 
person whose liability is ~ can be said to be as 
culpable as one whose breaeti of duty gave rise to that liabil-
ity in the first place. 23 
-~ 
?!/.We also have noted that a tippee may be liable if he otherwise "mis-
appropriate[s] or illegally obtain[s] the information." Dirks v. SEC, 
supra, at 665. Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 98-355, pp. 14-15 (1983). 
23 Our view is reinforced by Congress' recent enactment of the Insider 
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264-1265, 15 U. S. C.A. 
§ 78u(d)(2) (Supp. 1985), which imposes civil penalties on nontrading 
tippers out of belief that, "[a]bsent the tipper's misconduct, the tippee's 
' . 
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Moreover, insiders and broker-dealers who selectively dis-
close material nonpublic information commit a potentially 
broader range of violations than do tippees who trade on the 
basis of that information. A tippee trading on inside in-
formation will in man circu sta es be 1 ty of fraud 
agains m IVI ua shareholders, a violation for which the 
tipp~. But the i!!~ider, in disclq_sing 
su~tion, also frequently breaches fiduciary duties 
tow~l . 24 nd in cases where the tipper 
intentionally conveys false or materially incomplete informa-
tion to the tippee, the tipper commits an additional violation: 
fraud against the tippee. Such conduct is particularly egre-
gious when committed by a securities professional, who owes 
a duty of honesty and fair dealing toward his clients. Cf. 3 
Pomeroy § 942a, at 7 41. 25 Absent other culpable actions by a 
tippee that can fairly be said to outweigh these violations by 
insiders and broker-dealers, we do not believe that the tippee 
properly can be characterized as being of substantially equal 
culpability as his tippers. 
There is certainly nothing on the face of the complaint be-l 
fore us to suggest that the respondents were in pariaelicto -----;? 
with Lazzaro and N eadeau. The allegations are that Laz-
zaro and N eadeau masterminded this scheme to manipulate 
the market in TONM securities for tlieir own personal bene-
fit, and that they used the purchaSing respondents as un-
witting dupes to inflate the price of TONM stock. There-
trading would not occur" and that a tipper is therefore "most directly cul-
;>able in a violation," H. R. Rep. No. 98-355, at 9. 
v 24 See Dirks v. SEC, supra, at 655; Note, supra n. 14, at 1094, and n. 64. 
25 Under the Commission's "shingle theory," a broker-dealer who "hangs 
out his shingle" makes a "broad basic representation to the public at large 
that he will deal fairly with his customers and handle transactions , . . in 
the usual manner and in accordance with trade custom." S. Jaffe, Broker-
Dealers and Securities Markets § 7.09, at 145 (1977). See also Duker & 
Duker, 6 S. E. C. 386, 388-389 (1939); N. Wolfson, R. Phillips & T. Russo, 
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spondents may well have violated the securities laws, and in 
any event we place no "stamp of approval" on their conduct. 
Chiarella v. United States, supra, at 238 (STEVENS, J., con-
curring). But it is inescapable that, i( the allegations in ,..the 
complaint are true, Lazzaro and Neadeau "awakened in [the 
respondents] a Clesire for wrongful gain that might otherwise 
have remained dormant, inspired in [their] mind[s] an un-
founded idea that [they] were going to secure it, and th~b 
fraud and false pretenses deprived [them] of__llheiJ!]--rtloney," 
Stewart v. Wright, 147 F. 321,~~), cert. denied, 
203 U. S. 590 (1906)-conduct)ftore ~ulpable under any rea-
sonable view than that of the respondents. 26 
B 
We also believe that denying the in pari delicto defense in 
such circumstances will best promote the primary objective 
of the federal securities laws-protection of the investing 
public and the national economy through the promotion of "a 
high standard of business ethics . . . in every facet of the 
securities industry." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bu-
reau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 186-187 (1963). Although anum-
ber of lower courts have reasoned that a broad rule of caveat 
tippee would better serve this goal, 27 we believe the contrary 
211 Bateman Eichler has sought a reversal of the Ninth Circuit's judgment 
solely on the grounds that the investors were in pari delicto with its em-
ployee Lazzaro. Amicus Securities Industry Association (SIA), however, 
contends that the in pari delicto defense should in any event bar recovery 
against a brokerage finn whose only role has been that of a "controlling 
person" of the defrauding employee, see n. 1, supra, and whose liability is 
therefore "vicarious" and "secondary." Brief of SIA as Amicus Curiae 
20-24. This issue was not addressed by the Ninth Circuit, and Bateman 
Eichler has not raised it either in this Court or in the Ninth Circuit. We 
therefore express no views with respect to the liability of brokerage finns 
as "controlling persons" in cases such as this. 
zrsee, e. g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d, at 
1163-1164; Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F. 2d, at 705; Grumet v. 
Shearson!American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp., at 340; Wohl v. Blair & 
Co., 50 F. R. D., at 93. 
.. 
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position adopted by other courts represents the better view. 28 
To begin with, barring private actions in cases such as this 
would inexorably result in a number of alleged fraudulent 
practices going undetected by the authorities and unrem-
edied. The Securities and Exchange Commission has ad-
vised us that it "does not have the resources to police the in-
dustry sufficiently to ensure that false tipping does not occur 
er is consistently discovered," and that "[ w ]ithout the 
tippees' assistance, the Commission could not effectively 
prosecute false tipping-a difficult practice to detect." Brief . 
for SEC as Amicus Curiae 25. See also H. R. Rep. No. 
98-355, p. 6 (1983) ("In recent years, the securities markets 
have grown dramatically in size and complexity, while Com-
mission enforcement resources have declined"). Thus it is 
particularly important to permit "litigation among guilty par-
ties [that will serve] to expose their unlawful conduct and 
render them more easily subject to appropriate civil, admin-
istrative, and criminal penalties." Kuehnert v. Texstar 
Corp., 412 F. 2d 700, 706, n. 3·(CA5 1969) (Godbold, J., dis-
senting). The in pari delicto defense, by denying any incen-
tive to a defrauded tippee to bring suit against his defrauding 
tipper, would significantly undermine this important goal. 29 
28 See, e. g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., supra, at 706 . (Godbold, J., 
dissenting); Kirkland v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp., at 435-436; 
Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp., at 54-57. 
29 Our analysis is buttressed by reference to § 9(e) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 889, 15 U. S. C. § 78i(e), which allows co-
conspirators a right of contribution against "any person who, if joined in 
the original suit, would have been liable to make the same payment." This 
provision overrides the common-law rule against contribution from co-
conspirators, which was grounded on the premise that "parties generally 
in pari delicto should be left where they are found." Texas Industries, 
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 635 (1981). As the Com-
mission observes, "[s]urely, the Congress that provided that a brokerage 
professional such as Lazzaro could recover from his fellow manipulators 
should be understood to have permitted the victims of Lazzaro's manipula-
tive scheme to sue him." Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 26. 
84-679--0PINION .. 
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Moreover, we believe that deterrence of insider trading 
most frequently will be maximized by bringing enforcement 
pressures to bear on the sources of such information-corpo-
rate insiders and broker-dealers. 
"The true insider or the broker-dealer is at the fountain-
head of the confidential information . . . . If the pro-
phylactic purpose of the law is to restrict the use of all 
material inside information until it is made available to 
the investing public, then the most effective means of 
carrying out this policy is to nip in the bud the source of 
the information, the tipper, by discouraging him from · 
'making the initial disclosure which is the first step in 
the chain of dissemination.' This can most readily be 
achieved by making unavailable to him the defense of in 
pari delicto when sued by his tippee upon charges based 
upon alleged misinformation." Nathanson v. W eis, 
Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 57-58 (SDNY 
1971). 
In addition, corporate insiders · and broker-dealers will in 
many circumstances be more responsive to the deterrent 
pressure of potential sanctions; they are more likely than 
ordinary investors to be advised by counsel and thereby to be 
informed fully of the "allowable limits on their conduct." 
Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., supra, at 706 (Godbold, J., dis-
senting). 30 Although situations might well arise in which the 
relative culpabilities of the tippee and his insider source 
merit a different mix of deterrent incentives, we therefore 
conclude that in tipper-tippee situations such as the one~ 
30 It also has been suggested that "tippees constitute a potentially larger 
class and deterrent measures aimed exclusively at tippees, even if propor-
tionately as successful, will still leave a large number of violations un-
deterred. Thus, [even if] tippers and tippees are assumed to be equally 
responsive to deterrent measures, it would appear preferable to increase 
deterrent pressure against tippers by allowing tippee recovery." Note, 
supra n. 14, at 1096-1097. 
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fore us the factors discussed above preclude recognition of 
the in pari delicto defense. 31 
Lower courts reaching a contrary conclusion have typically 
asserted that, absent a vigorous allowance of the in pari de-
licto defense, tippees would have, "in effect, an enforceable 
warranty that secret information is true," id., at 705, and 
thus no incentive not to trade on that information. 32 These 
courts have reasoned, in other words, that tippees in such 
circumstances would be in "the enviable position of 'heads-I-
win tails-you-lose,"' Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F. 2d 1074, 1082 
(CA5 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 966 (1981)-if the tip is · 
correct, the tippee will reap illicit profits, while if the tip fails 
to yield the expected return, he can sue to recover damages. 
We believe the "enforceable warranty" theory is over-
stated and overlooks significant factors that serve to deter 
tippee trading irrespective of whether the in pari delicto de-
fense is allowed. First, tippees who bring suit in an attempt 
to cash in on their "enforceable warranties" expose them-
selves to the threat of substantial civil and criminal penalties 
for their own potentially illegal conduct. 33 Second, plaintiffs 
31 Some courts have suggested that "even where the fault of plaintiff and 
defendant were relatively equal, simultaneous and mutual, the court might 
still reject the [in pari delicto] defense if it appeared that the defendant's 
unlawful activities were o( a sort likely to have a substantial impact on the 
investing public, and the primary legal responsibility for and ability to con-
trol that impact is with defendant." Woolfv. SD Cohn & Co., 515 F. 2d, 
at 604; see also Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co. , 615 F. 2d, at 76, n. 6. Be-
cause we conclude that the complaint in this case does not demonstrate that 
the respondents bore substantially equal responsibility for the violations 
they seek to redress, we need not resolve this question here. 
32 See, e. g. , Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F . 2d 1074, 1082 (CA5 1980), cert. 
denied, 450 U. S. 966 (1981); Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 
2d, at 1163-1164; In re Haven Industries, Inc., 462 F . Supp., at 179-180. 
33 In addition to potential liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, inves-
tors also are subject to liability under §§ 2 and 3 of the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1264-1265, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78u(d)(2), 78ff(a) 
(Supp. 1985), which imposes severe civil sanctions on persons who have il-
legally used inside information, as well as criminal fines of up to $100,000. 
.. 84-679-0PINION 
BATEMAN EICHLER, HILL RICHARDS, INC. v. BERNER 19 
in litigation under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may only recover 
against defendants who have acted with scienter. See Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185 (1976). Thus "if the tip 
merely fails to 'pan out' or if the information itself proves ac-
curate but the stock fails to move in the anticipated direction, 
the investor stands to lose all of his investment. Only in the 
situation where the investor has been deliberately defrauded 
will he be able to maintain a private suit in an attempt to re-
coup his money."· 730 F. 2d, at 1324, n. 3. 34 
We therefore conclude that the public interest will most 
frequently be advanced if defrauded tippees are permitted to 
bring suit and to expose illegal practices by corporate in-
siders and broker-dealers to full public view for appropriate 
sanctions. As the Ninth Circuit emphasized in this case, ~ 
there is no warrant to giving corporate insiders and broker-
dealers "a license to defraud the investing public with little 
fear of prosecution." I d., at 1323. 
Affirmed. 
34 The SEC also argues that courts should deter tippees in cases such as f 
this by limiting potential recovery to out-of-pocket losses. The courts 
below did not address this issue, and we express no views on the proper 
measure of relief. Cf. Pe:rma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S., at 140. 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84- 679 
BATEMAN EICHLER, HILL RICHARDS, 
INCORPORATED, PETITIONER v. I) A I f"LAA~ 
CARL F. BERNER ET AL. r~ 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF /} /. ~A-L /A--~ 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ~ -y -
[May -, 1985] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented by this case is whether the com-
mon-law in pari delicto defense bars a private damages 
action under the federal secp.rities laws against corporate 
insiders and broker-dealers who fraudulently induce inves-
tors to purchase securities by misrepresenting that they are 
conveying material nonpublic information about the issuer. 
I 
The respondent investors filed this action in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California, 
alleging that they incurred substantial trading losses as a 
result of a conspiracy between Charles Lazzaro, a registered 
securities broker employed by the petitioner Bateman 
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. (Bateman Eichler), and Leslie 
Neadeau, President ofT. 0. N. M. Oil & Gas Exploration 
Corporation (TONM), to induce them to purchase large quan-
tities of TONM over-the-counter stock by divulging false and 
materially incomplete information about the company on the 




'The investors named Lazzaro, Neadeau, TONM, and Bateman Eichler 
as defendants. Complaint ~~5-8, App. 7-8. The investors charged that 
Neadeau and TONM had "directly and indirectly participated with, aided 
and abetted, and conspired with" Lazzaro in the scheme. I d. ~ 9, App. 8; 
C,~~ ~1)} L~ ~ --rc, c~ -tlo ~w 
~~ ~U2-?ko ·-L I 
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cally, Lazzaro is alleged to have told the respondents that he 
personally knew TONM insiders and had learned, inter alia, 
that (a) "[ v ]ast amounts of gold had been discovered in Suri-
nam, and TONM had options on thousands of acres in gold-
producing regions of Surinam"; 2 (b) the discovery was "not 
publicly known, but would subsequently be announced"; (c) 
TONM was currently engaged in negotiations with other 
companies to form a joint venture for mining the Surinamese 
gold; and (d) when this information was made public, "TONM 
stock, which was then selling from $1.50 to $3.00/share, 
would increase in value from $10 to $15/share within a short 
period of time, and ... might increase to $100/share" within 
a year. Complaint ~~16-17, App. 10-12.3 Some of the 
respondents aver that they contacted N eadeau and inquired 
whether Lazzaro's tips were accurate; N eadeau stated that 
the information was "not public knowledge" and "would nei-
see also id. 1140, App. 17. Bateman Eichler's liability was premised on its 
status as a "controlling person" of Lazzaro within the meaning of § 20(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 899, 15 U. S. C. § 78t(a). 
Complaint 11115, 39, App. 7, 16-17. · Seen. 26, infra. 
Although Lazzaro, Neadeau, and TONM also are respondents in this 
Court, see Sup. Ct. Rule 19.6, we shall use "respondents" to refer exclu-
sively to the investor plaintiffs, who are defending the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this Court. 
2 Gold exploration has been conducted in Surinam for more than 100 
years, but production has declined dramatically since early in this century. 
Complaint 1111, App. 9. The areas in which TONM had been engaged in 
exploration "were historically mined by Surinamese natives using 
primative methods," and were accessible to the outside world "primarily 
by motorized canoes and helicopter." !d. 1112, App. 9. Lazzaro allegedly 
told the investors that TONM's discovery "compared favorably to, if not 
better than, those in South Africa," and that development "would not 
require deep mining" because "[g]eologists in Surinam were finding gold 
nuggets in dry creek beds." ld. 1116, App. 11. 
3 Lazzaro also allegedly told the investors that, after the announcement, 
TONM share~olders "would automatically receive" additional stock in 
TONM's subsidiary, International Gold and Diamond Exploration Corp., 
Inc., "without the payment of any additional monies." Ibid. (emphasis in 
original). 
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ther confirm nor deny those claims," but allegedly advised 
that "Lazzaro was a very trustworthy and a good man." I d. 
~ 19, App. 12. 
The respondents admitted in their complaint that they pur-
chased TONM stock, much of it through Lazzaro, "on the 
premise that Lazzaro was privy to certain information not 
otherwise available to the general public." I d. ~ 15, App. 10. 
Their shares initially increased dramatically in price, but ul-
timately declined to substantially below the purchase price 
when the joint mining venture fell through. I d. ~~ 22-26, 
App. 13-14. 4 
Lazzaro and Neadeau are alleged to have made the repre-
sentations set forth above knowing that the representations 
"were untrue and/or contained only half-truths, material 
omissions of fact and falsehoods,'' 5 intending that the re-
spondents would rely thereon, and for the purpose of "influ-
enc[ing] and manipulat[ing] the price of TONM stock" so as 
"to profit themselves through the taking of commissions and 
secret profits." Id. ~~23, 30, 38, App. 13, 15-16.6 The 
• The respondents purchased the stock in late 1979 and early 1980 for 
between $1.50 and $3.00 per share, and the price of the stock rose to $7.00 
per share by the fourth quarter of !980. /d. ~ 22, App. 13. "[S]ome or 
all" of the respondents claim to have told Lazzaro at this time that they 
wanted to sell their shares, but "Lazzaro stated that he would let the plain-
tiffs know when to sell the TONM stock, and that they should not sell just 
because the stock had reached $7.00/share because it would go higher still. " 
Ibid. The stock then plummeted "to approximately $1.00 per share" by 
the end of 1980, and fell to "less than $1.00 a share" early the next year. 
/d. ~~ 24-25, App. 14. 
5 In the alternative, Lazzaro and Neadeau are alleged to have made 
these representations "recklessly with wanton disregard for the truth." 
I d. ~ 32, App. 15. 
8 Neadeau is alleged to have owned approximately 100,000 shares of the 
outstanding common stock of TONM, and Lazzaro is alleged to have "con-
trolled over a million shares of TONM stock through stocks purchased by 
himself and his clients." /d. ~~ 8, 23, App. 8, 13. See also id. ~ 16, App. 
12 ("Lazzaro and his relatives owned a large block of TONM stock"). The 
investors charged that "Lazzaro could thereby and did influence and 
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respondents contended that this scheme violated, inter alia, 
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 
15 U. S. C. § 78j(b),7 and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1984). 8 They sought capi-
tal losses and lost profits, punitive damages, and costs and 
attorney's fees. App. 26. 9 
manipulate the price of TONM stock through purchases and sales thereof, 
and through the dissemination of false information to plaintiffs and others." 
Id. 1123, App. 13. 
7 That section provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange-
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
8 That rule provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 
9 In addition, the respondents sought recovery pursuant to § 17(a) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77q(a), see 
Complaint 111148-50, App. 20, which the parties and the courts below have 
treated as comparable to § 10(b) for purposes of applying the in pari delicto 
defense. We express no view as to whether a private right of action exists 
under § 17(a). Compare Keys v. Wolfe, 709 F. 2d 413, 416 (CA5 1983), 
with Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F. 2d 808, 815 (CA9 
1981). The respondents also alleged various other federal claims and 
pendent state-law claims that are not before us. 
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The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to 
state a claim. The court reasoned that "trading on insider 
information is itself a violation of rule 10b--5" and that the 
allegations in the complaint demonstrated that the respond-
ents themselves had "violated the particular provision under 
which recovery is sought." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. 
Thus, the court concluded, the respondents were in pari de-
licto with Lazzaro and N eadeau and absolutely barred from 
recovery. Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 730 
F. 2d 1319 (1984). Although it assumed that the respond-
ents had violated the federal securities laws, id., at 1324, the 
court nevertheless concluded that "securities professionals 
and corporate officers who have allegedly engaged in fraud 
should not be permitted to invoke the in pari delicto doctrine 
to . shield themselves from the consequences of their fraudu-
lent misrepresentation," id., at 1320. The Court of Appeals 
noted that this Court had sharply restricted the availability 
of the in pari delicto defense in antitrust actions, see Perma 
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 
134 (1968), and concluded thah essentially for three reasons, 
there was no basis "for creating a different rule for private 
actions initiated under the federal securities laws," 730 F. 2d, 
at 1322. First, the court reasoned that, in cases such as this, 
defrauded tippees are not in fact "equally responsible" for the 
violations they allege. I d., at 1322. Second, the court be-
lieved that allowing the defense in these circumstances would 
be "totally incompatible with the overall aims of the securi-
ties law" because the threat of a private damages action is 
necessary to deter "insider-tipster[s]" from defrauding the 
public. Id., at 1323. Finally, the court noted the avail-
ability of means other than an outright preclusion of suit to 
deter tippees from trading on inside information. I d., at 
1324, n. 3. 
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The lower courts have divided over the proper scope of the 
in pari delicto defense in securities litigation. 10 We granted 
certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1985). We affirm. 
II 
The common-law defense at issue in this case derives from· 
the Latin, in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis: "in a 
case of equal fault the position of the defending party is the 
better one." 11 The defense is grounded on two premises: 
first, that courts should not lend their good offices to mediat-
ing disputes among wrongdoers; 12 and second, that denying 
'
0 See, e. g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d 1152 (CA3) 
(allowing defense), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 965 (1977); Malamphy v. Real-
Tex Enterprises, Inc., 527 F. 2d 978 (CA4 1975) (per curiam) (sustaining 
submission of defense to jury); Woolf v. SD Cohn & Co., 515 F. 2d 591, 
601-605 (CA5 1975) (rejecting defense on facts of case), on reh'g, 521 F. 2d 
225, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 426 U. S. 944 (1976); 
Keuhnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F. 2d 700 (CA5 1969) (allowing defense); 
Kirkland v. E . F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 433-437 (ED Mich. 
1983) (rejecting defense on motion for summary judgment); Grumet v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc ., 564 F. Supp. 336 (NJ 1983) (allowing 
defense); Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F . Supp. 882, 
884-887 (SD Fla. 1981) (rejecting defense on motion to dismiss); Moholt v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451 (DC 1979) (rejecting defense 
on motion for summary judgment); In re Haven Industries, Inc., 462 F. 
Supp. 172, 177-180 (SDNY 1978) (allowing defense); Nathanson v. Weis, 
Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (SDNY 1971) (rejecting defense); 
Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F. R. D. 89 (SDNY 1970) (denying motion to 
strike defense). Cf. Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 
710 F . 2d 678, 691 (CA111983); Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co. , 615 F. 2d 68, 
76 (CA2 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1123 (1981); Can-Am Petroleum Co. 
v. Beck, 331 F. 2d 371, 373 (CAlO 1964). 
11 Black's Law Dictionary 711 (rev. 5th ed. 1977). 
12 See, e. g., Higgins v. McCrea, 116 U.S. 671, 685 (1886); Austin's 
Adm'x v. Winston's Ex'r, 11 Va. 33, 47 (1806) ("He who comes here for 
relief must draw his justice from pure fountains"). See also Holman v. 
Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K. B. 1775): 
"The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and 
defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is 
not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed . . . . The 
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judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means 
of deten-ing illegality. 13 In its classic formulation, the in 
pari delicto defense was nan-owly limited to situations where 
the plaintiff truly bore at least equal responsibility for his 
injury, because "in cases where both parties are in delicto, 
concun-ing in an illegal act, it does not always follow that 
they stand in pari delicto; for there may be, and often are, 
very different degrees in their guilt." 1 J. Story, Com-
mentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 304-305 (1886) (Story). 
Thus there might be an "inequality of condition" between the 
parties, id., at 305, or "a confidential relationship between 
th[em]" that determined their "relative standing" before a 
court, 3 J. Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence 
§ 942a, at 741 (5th ed. 1941) (Pomeroy). In addition, the 
public policy considerations that undergirded the in pari de-
licto defense were frequently construed as precluding the de-
fense even where the plaintiff bore substantial fault for his 
injury: "there may be on the part of the court itself a neces-
sity of supporting the public interests or public policy in 
many cases, however reprehensible the acts of the parties 
may be." 1 Story 305. Notwithstanding these traditional 
limitations, many courts have given the in pari delicto 
defense a broad application to bar actions where plaintiffs 
simply have been involved generally in "the same sort of 
principle of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non oritur actio [out of fraud 
no action arises] . . . . It is upon that ground the Court goes; not for the 
sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a 
plaintiff." 
'
8 See, e. g. , McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669-670 (1898): 
"To refuse to grant either party to an illegal contract judicial aid for the 
enforcement of his alleged rights under it tends strongly towards reducing 
the number of such transactions to a minimum. The more plainly parties 
understand that when they enter into contracts of this nature they place 
themselves outside the protection of the law, so far as that protection con-
sists in aiding them to enforce such contracts, the less inclined will they be 
to enter into them. In that way the public secures the benefit of a rigid 
adherence to the law." 
84-67~0PINION 
8 BATEMAN EICHLER, HILL RICHARDS, INC. v. BERNER 
wrongdoing" as defendants. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. 
International Parts Corp., 392 U. 8., at 138. 14 
In Perma Life, we emphasized "the inappropriateness of 
invoking broad common-law barriers to relief where a private 
suit serves important public purposes." 392 U. S., at 138. 
That case involved a treble-damages action against a Midas 
Muffler franchisor by several of its dealers, who alleged that 
the franchise agreement created a conspiracy to restrain 
trade in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 15 The 
lower courts barred the action on the grounds that the deal-
ers, as parties to the agreement, were in pari delicto with 
the franchisor. In reversing that determination, the opinion 
for this Court emphasized that there was no indication that 
Congress had intended to incorporate the defense into the 
antitrust laws, which "are best served by insuring that the 
private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone 
contemplating [illegal] business behavior." I d., at 139. Ac-
cordingly, the opinion concluded that "the doctrine of in pari 
delicto, with its complex scope, contents, and effe~ts, is not 
to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action." I d., at 
140. The opinion reserved the question whether a plaintiff 
who engaged in "truly compfete involvement and participa-
tion in a monopolistic scheme"-one who "aggressively sup-
port[ed] and further[ed] the monopolistic scheme as a neces-
sary part and parcel of it" -could be barred from pursuing a 
damages action, finding that the muffler dealers had rela-
tively little bargaining power and that they had been coerced 
by the franchisor into agreeing to many of the contract's pro-
visions. Ibid. 
,. See also Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d, at 1157; L. 
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 1197 (1983); Comment, Avail-
ability of an In Pari Delicto Defense in Rule 101>--5 Tippee Suits, 77 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1084, 1086, n. 15 (1977). 
'
6 Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 et seq., as amended, 15 U.S. C. § 1 et seq.; 
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 et seq., as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 12 et seq. 
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In separate opinions, five Justices agreed that the concept 
of "equal fault" should be narrowly defined in litigation aris-
ing under federal regulatory statutes. 16 "[B]ecause of the 
strong public interest in eliminating restraints on compe-
tition, ... many of the refinements of moral worth demanded 
of plaintiffs by ... many of the variations of in pari delicto 
should not be applicable in the antitrust field." Id., at 151 
(MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). The five Justices con-
cluded, however, that where a plaintiff truly bore at least 
substantially equal responsibility for the violation, a defense 
based on such fault-whether or not denominated in pari de-
licto-should be recognized in antitrust litigation. 17 
Bateman Eichler argues that Perma Life-with its empha-
sis on the importance of analyzing the effects that fault-based 
defenses would have on the enforcement of congressional 
goals-is of only marginal relevance to a private damages ac-
tion under the federal securities laws. Specifically, Bateman 
Eichler observes that Congress expressly provided for pri-
vate antitrust actions-thereby manifesting a "desire to go 
beyond the common law in the antitrust statute in order to 
provide substantial encouragement to private enforcement 
and to help deter anticompetitive conduct"-whereas private 
rights of action under§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
16 See 392 U. S., at 145 (WHITE, J., concurring); id., at 147-148 (Fortas, 
J., concurring in result); id., at 148-149, 151 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in 
result); id., at 154-155 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
17 JusTICE WHITE concluded that "the in pari delicto defense in its his-
toric formulation is not a useful concept" in antitrust law, but emphasized 
that he "would deny recovery where plaintiff and defendant bear substan-
tially equal responsibility for injury resulting to one of them." Id., at 143, 
146. The other four Justices would have allowed explicit, though limited, 
use of the in pari delicto defense itself. I d., at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring 
in result); id., at 148-149 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result); id., at 153 
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of 1934 are merely implied from that provision 18-thereby, 
apparently, supporting a broader application of the in pari 
delicto defense. Brief for Petitioner 32. Bateman Eichler 
buttresses this argument by observing that, unlike the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts, the securities laws contain savings 
provisions directing that "[t]he rights and remedies provided 
by [those laws] shall be in addition to any and all other rights 
and remedies that may exist at law or in equity" 19-again, 
apparently, supporting a broader scope for fault-based de-
fenses than recognized in Perma Life. 
We disagree. Nothing in Perma Life suggested that pub-
lic policy implications should govern only where Congress ex-
pressly provides for private remedies; the classic formulation 
of the in pari delicto doctrine itself required a careful consid-
eration of such implications before allowing the defense. See 
supra, at --. Moreover, we repeatedly have emphasized 
that implied private actions provide "a most effective weapon 
in the enforcement" of the securities laws and are "a neces-
sary supplement to Commission action." J. I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 432 (1964); see also Blue Chip Stamps 
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730 (1975). In addi-
tion, we have eschewed rigid common-law barriers in con-
struing the securities laws. ' See, e. g., Herman & MacLean 
v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 388-389 (1983) (common-law 
doctrines are sometimes of "questionable pertinence" in ap-
plying the securities laws, which were intended "to rectify 
perceived deficiencies in the available common-law protec-
tions by establishing higher standards of conduct in the 
securities industry"); A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene 
Mines Corp., 312 U. S. 38, 43 (1941) (rejecting the unclean-
18 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores , 421 U. S. 723, 730 
(1975); Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S. 
6, 13, n. 9 (1971). 
19 See § 16 of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, 15 U. S. C. § 77p; 
§ 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 903, as amended, 15 
U. S. C. § 78bb(a). · 
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hands defense on the facts of the case because it would "seri-
ously hinder rather than aid the real purpose" of the securi-
ties laws). 20 We therefore conclude that the principles of 
Perma Life apply with full force to implied causes of action 
under the federal securities laws. Accordingly, a private 
action for damages in these circumstances may be barred on 
the grounds of the plaintiff's own culpability only where (1) as 
a direct result of his own actions, the plaintiff bears at least 
substantially equal responsibility for the violations he seeks 
to redress, and (2) preclusion of suit would not measurably 
interfere with the effective enforcement of the securities laws 
and protection of the investing public. 
A 
The District Court and Court of Appeals proceeded on the 
assumption that the respondents had violated § lO(b) and 
Rule lOb-5, see supra, at ---an assumption we accept 
for purposes of resolving the issue before us. Cf. A. C. 
Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Co., supra, at 40-41. 21 
20 In Frost, we quoted approvingly from an SEC memorandum arguing 
that "'it appears to us to be entirely immaterial whether in such a case, the 
agreement is labelled "void" or the parties are held to be "in pari delicto." 
There, labels, as often is the case, rperely state the conclusion reached, but 
do not aid in solution of the prob,lem. The ultimate issue is whether the 
result in the particular case would effectuate or frustrate the purposes of 
the Act."' 312 U. S., at 44, n. 2. 
21 We note, however, the inappropriateness of resolving the question of 
the respondents' fault solely on the basis of the allegations set forth in the 
complaint. A tippee generally has a duty to disclose or to abstain from 
trading on material nonpublic information only when he knows or should 
know that his insider source "has breached his fiduciary duty to the share-
holders by disclosing the information"-in other words, where the insider 
has sought to "benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." Dirks 
v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646, 660, 662 (1983). Such benefit can derive from the 
insider's use of the information to secure a "pecuniary gain," a "reputa-
tional benefit that will translate into future earnings," or simply to confer 
"a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend." I d., at 
663-664. See also id., at 655, n. 14 (alternative basis for liability where 
tippee has "entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of 
' . 
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Bateman Eichler contends that the respondents' delictum 
was substantially par to that of Lazzaro and N eadeau for two 
reasons. First, whereas many antitrust plaintiffs partici-
pate in illegal restraints of trade only "passively" or as the 
the business of the enterprise and [is] given access to information solely for 
corporate purposes"). Although the respondents certainly were aware 
that Lazzaro stood to gain from disclosure by the commissions he would 
earn, it is uncertain whether they had any basis to believe that N eadeau-
the insider from whose potential breach all liability flows-had violated his 
fiduciary duties to TONM's shareholders by revealing the joint-venture in-
formation to Lazzaro. The respondents might well have believed that 
Neadeau provided the information to Lazzaro as a favor or otherwise acted 
against the shareholders' interests, but the complaint does not set forth 
sufficient facts to conclude that this was the case. 
In addition, we accept the lower courts' assumption about the respond-
ents' violations notwithstanding the uncertain character of the information 
the respondents traded on. The complaint rather strongly suggests that 
much of the information Lazzaro conveyed about the explorations and 
joint•venture negotiations was true, but that it was deceptive by virtue of 
exaggeration and the failure to include additional material information. 
See 111110-12, 18, 20, 30, App. 8-9, 12-13, 15. If this was the case, and if 
the respondents otherwise acquired a derivative duty within the meaning 
of Dirks, there is no question that their trading on the basis of this informa-
tion violated the securities laws. If the information was entirely false, the 
SEC and Bateman Eichler contend that the respondents, by trading on 
what they believed was material nonpublic information, are nevertheless 
guilty of at least an attempted violation of the securities laws if they other-
wise believed that N eadeau had breached his fiduciary duties. This view 
has drawn substantial support among the lower courts. See, e. g., Tarasi 
v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d, at 1159-1160; Kuehnert v. Texstar 
Corp., 412 F. 2d, at 714; Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 
F. Supp., at 340. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that they 
could not have inherited any duty to disclose false information, and that the 
case is properly viewed as governed by the doctrine of legal impossibility, 
which would bar any liability, rather than factual impossibility, which 
would permit liability on an attempt theory. See also Note, The Availabil-
ity of the In Pari Delicto Defense in Tippee-Tipper Rule 10b-5 Actions 
After Dirks v. SEC, 62 Wash. U. L. Q. 519, 540-542 (1984). Because this 
issue has not been fully briefed and was not considered by the courts 
below, we express no views on it and simply proceed on the assumption 
that the respondents' activities rendered them in delicto. 
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result of economic coercion, as was the case in Perma Life, 
the ordinary tippee acts voluntarily in choosing to trade on 
inside information. Second, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply lit-
erally to "any person" who violates their terms, and do not 
recognize gradations of culpability. 
We agree that the typically voluntary nature of an inves-
tor's decision impermissibly to trade on an inside tip renders 
the investor more blameworthy than someone who is party to 
a contract solely by virtue of another's overweening bargain-
ing power. We disagree, however, that an investor who en-
gages in such trading is necessarily as blameworthy as a cor-
porate insider or broker-dealer who discloses the information 
for personal gain. Notwithstanding the broad reach of 
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, there are important distinctions be-
tween the relative culpabilities of tippers, securities profes-
sionals, and tippees in these circumstances. The Court has 
made clear in recent Terms that a tippee's use of material 
nonpublic information does not violate § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
unless the tippee .owes a corresponding duty to disclose the 
information. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646, 654-664 (1983); 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230, n. 12 (1980). 
That duty typically is "derivative from . . . the insider's 
duty." Dirks v. SEC, suprcr, at 659; see also id., at 664. In 
'other words, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as 
arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the in-
sider's breach of a fiduciary duty" toward corporate share-
holders. Chiarella v. United States, supra, at 230, n. 12.22 
In the context of insider trading, we do not believe that a 
person whose liability is solely derivative can be said to be as 
culpable as one whose breach of duty gave rise to that liabil-
ity in the first place. 23 
'l!l.We also have noted that a tippee may be liable if he otherwise "mis-
appropriate[s] or illegally obtain[s] the information." Dirks v. SEC, 
supra, at 665. Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 98-355, pp. 14-15 (1983). 
23 Our view is reinforced by Congress' recent enactment of the Insider 
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Moreover, insiders and broker-dealers who selectively dis-
close material nonpublic information commit a potentially 
broader range of violations than do tippees who trade on the 
basis of that information. A tippee trading on inside in-
formation will in many circumstances be guilty of fraud 
against individual shareholders, a violation for which the 
tipper shares responsibility. But the insider, in disclosing 
such information, also frequently breaches fiduciary duties 
toward the issuer itself. 24 And in cases where the tipper 
intentionally conveys false or materially incomplete informa-
tion to the tippee, the tipper commits an additional violation: 
fraud against the tippee. Such conduct is particularly egre-
gious when committed by a securities professional, who owes 
a duty of honesty and fair dealing toward his clients. Cf. 3 
Pomeroy§ 942a, at 741. Absent other culpable actions by a 
tippee that can fairly be said to outweigh these violations by 
insiders and broker-dealers, we do not believe that the tippee 
properly can be characterized as being of substantially equal 
culpability as his tippers. 
There is certainly no basis for concluding at this stage of 
this litigation that the respondents were in pari delicto with 
Lazzaro and N eadeau. The allegations are that Lazzaro and 
Neadeau masterminded this ' scheme to manipulate the mar-
ket in TONM securities for their own personal benefit, and 
that they used the purchasing respondents as unwitting 
dupes to inflate the price of TONM stock. The respondents 
may well have violated the securities laws, and in any event 
we place no "stamp of approval" on their conduct. Chiarella 
v. United States, supra, at 238 (STEVENS, J., concurring). 
But accepting the facts set forth in the complaint as true-as 
we must in reviewing the District Court's dismissal on the 
§ 78u(d)(2) (Supp. 1985), which imposes civil penalties on nontrading 
tippers out of belief that, "[a]bsent the tipper's misconduct, the tippee's 
trading would not occur" and that a tipper is therefore "most directly cul-
pable in a violation," H. R. Rep. No. 98-355, at 9. 
24 See Dirks v. SEC, supra, at 655; Note, supra n. 14, at 1094, and n. 64. 
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pleadings-Lazzaro and N eadeau "awakened in [the respond-
ents] a desire for wrongful gain that might otherwise have re-
mained dormant, inspired in [their] mind[s] an unfounded 
idea that [they] were going to secure it, and then by fraud 
and false pretenses deprived [them] of [their] money," Stew-
art v. Wright, 147 F. 321, 328-329 (CA8), cert. denied, 203 
U. S. 590 (1906)-actions that, if they occurred, were far 
more culpable under any reasonable view than the respond-
ents' alleged conduct. 25 
B 
We also believe that denying the in pari delicto defense in 
such circumstances will best promote the primary objective 
of the federal securities laws-protection of the investing 
public and the national economy through the promotion of "a 
high standard of business ethics . . . in every facet of the 
securities industry." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bu- .. 
reau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 186-187 (1963). Although anum-
ber of lower courts have reasoned that a broad rule of caveat 
tippee would better serve this goal, 26 we believe the contrary 
position adopted by other courts represents the bette~ view.2:1 
26 Bateman Eichler has sought a reversal of the Ninth Circuit's judgment 
solely on the grounds that the inv~stors were in pari delicto with its em-
ployee Lazzaro. Amicus Securities Industry Association (SIA), however, 
contends that the in pari delicto defense should in any event bar recovery 
against a brokerage firm whose only role has been that of a "controlling 
person" of the defrauding employee, see n. 1, supra, and whose liability is 
therefore "vicarious" and "secondary." Brief of SIA as Amicus Curiae 
20-24. This issue was not addressed by the Ninth Circuit, and Bateman 
Eichler has not raised it either in this Court or in the Ninth Circuit. We 
therefore express no views with respect to the liability of brokerage firms 
as "controlling persons" in cases such as this. 
26 See, e. g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 2d, at 
1163-1164; Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F. 2d, at 705; Gmmet v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp., at 340; Wohl v. Blair & 
Co., 50 F. R. D., at 93. 
27 See, e. g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., supra, at 706 (Godbold, J., 
dissenting); Kirkland v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 564 F . Supp., at 435-436; 
Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp., at 54-57. 
' . 
84-67~0PINION 
16 BATEMAN EICHLER, HILL RICHARDS, INC. v. B.ERNER 
To begin with, barring private actions in cases such as this 
would inexorably result in a number of alleged fraudulent 
practices going undetected by the authorities and unrem-
edied. The Securities and Exchange Commission has ad-
vised us that it "does not have the resources to police the in-
dustry sufficiently to ensure that false tipping does not occur 
or is consistently discovered," and that "[w]ithout the 
tippees' assistance, the Commission could not effectively 
prosecute false tipping-a difficult practice to detect." Brief 
for SEC as Amicus Curiae 25. See also H. R. Rep. No. 
98-355, p. 6 (1983) ("In recent years, the securities markets 
have grown dramatically in size and complexity, while Com-
mission enforcement resources have declined"). Thus it is 
particularly important to permit "litigation among guilty par-
ties [that will serve] to expose their unlawful conduct and 
render them more easily subject to appropriate civil, admin-
istrative, and criminal penalties." Kuehnert v. Texstar 
Corp., 412 F. 2d 700, 706, n. 3 (CA5 1969) (Godbold, J., dis-
senting).. The in pari delicto defense, by denying any incen-
tive to a defrauded tippee to bring suit against his defrauding 
tipper, would significantly undermine this important goal. 28 
Moreover, we believe that deterrence of insider trading 
most frequently will be maximized by bringing enforcement 
pressures to bear on the sources of such information-corpo-
rate insiders and broker-dealers. 
28 Our analysis is buttressed by reference to § 9(e) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 889, 15 U. S. C. § 78i(e), which allows co-
conspirators a right of contribution against "any person who, if joined in 
the original suit, would have been liable to make the same payment." This 
provision overrides the common-law rule against contribution from co-
conspirators, which was grounded on the premise that "parties generally 
in pari delicto should be left where they' are found." Texas Industries , 
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc ., 451 U. S. 630, 635 (1981). As the Com-
mission observes, "[s]urely, the Congress that provided that a brokerage 
professional such as Lazzaro could recover from his fellow manipulators 
should be understood to have permitted the victims of Lazzaro's manipula-
tive scheme to sue him." Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 26. 
' . 
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"The true insider or the broker-dealer is at the fountain-
head of the confidential information . . . . If the pro-
phylactic purpose of the law is to restrict the use of all 
material inside information until it is made available to 
the investing public, then the most effective means of 
carrying out this policy is to nip in the bud the source of 
the information, the tipper, by discouraging him from 
'making the initial disclosure which is the first step in 
the chain of dissemination.' This can most readily be . 
achieved by making unavailable to him the defense of in 
pari delicto when sued by his tippee upon charges based 
upon alleged misinformation." Nathanson v. W eis, 
Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 57-58 (SDNY 
1971). 
In addition, corporate insiders and broker-dealers will in 
many circumstances be · more responsive to the deterrent 
pressure of potential sanctions; they are more likely than 
ordinary investors to be advised by counsel and thereby to be 
informed fully of the "allowable limits on their conduct." 
Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., supra, at 706 (Godbold, J., dis-
senting). 29 Although situations might well arise in which the 
relative culpabilities of the tippee and his insider source 
merit a different mix of deterrent incentives, we therefore 
conclude that in tipper-tippee situations such as the one be-
fore us the factors discussed above preclude recognition of 
the in pari delicto defense. 30 
29 It also has been suggested that "tippees constitute a potentially larger 
class and deterrent measures aimed exclusively at tippees, even if propor-
tionately as successful, will still leave a large number of violations un-
deterred. Thus, [even if] tippers and tippees are assumed to be equally 
responsive to deterrent measures, it would appear preferable to increase 
deterrent pressure against tippers by allowing tippee recovery." Note, 
supra n. 14, at 1096-1097. 
30 Some courts have suggested that "even where the fault of plaintiff and 
defendant were relatively equal, simultaneous and mutual, the court might 
still reject the [in pari delicto} defense if it appeared that the defendant's 
unlawful activities were of a sort likely to have a substantial impact on the 
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Lower courts reaching a contrary conclusion have typically 
asserted that, absent a vigorous allowance of the in pari de-
licto defense, tippees would have, "in effect, an enforceable 
warranty that secret information is true," id., at 705, and 
thus no incentive not to trade on that information. 31 These 
courts have reasoned, in other words, that tippees in such 
circumstances would be in "the enviable position of 'heads-1-
win tails-you-lose,"' Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F. 2d 1074, 1082 
(CA5 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 966 (1981)-if the tip is 
correct, the tippee will reap illicit profits, while if the tip fails 
to yield the expected return, he can sue to recover damages. 
We believe the "enforceable warranty" theory is over-
stated and overlooks significant factors that serve to deter 
tippee trading irrespective of whether the in pari delicto de-
fense is allowed. First, tippees who bring suit in an attempt 
to cash in on their "enforceable warranties" expose them-
selves to the threat of substantial civil and criminal penalties 
for their own potentially illegal conduct. 32 Second, plaintiffs 
in litigation under § 10(b) and Rule 10lr5 may only recover 
against defendants who have acted with scienter. See Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185 (1976). Thus "if the tip 
merely fails to 'pan out' or if the information itself proves ac-
investing public, and the primary legal responsibility for and ability to con-
. trol that impact is with defendant." Woolfv. SD Cohn & Co., 515 F. 2d, 
at 604; see also Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F. 2d, at 76, n. 6. Be-
cause there is no basis at this stage of the litigation for concluding that the 
respondents bore substantially equal responsibility for the violations they 
seek to redress, we need not address the circumstances in which suit might 
be allowed notwithstanding the plaintiff's substantially equal fault. 
31 See, e. g., Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F. 2d 1074, 1082 (CA5 1980), cert. 
denied, 450 U. S. 966 (1981); Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F. 
2d, at 1163-1164; In re Haven Industries, Inc., 462 F. Supp., at 179-180. 
32 In addition to potential liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, inves-
tors also are subject to liability under §§ 2 and 3 of the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1264-1265, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78u(d)(2), 
78ff(a) (Supp. 1985), which imposes severe civil sanctions on persons who 
have illegally used inside information, as well as criminal fines of up to 
$100,000. 
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curate but the stock fails to move in the anticipated direction, 
the investor stands to lose all of his investment. Only in the 
situation where the investor has been deliberately defrauded 
will he be able to maintain a private suit in an attempt to re-
coup his money." 730 F. 2d, at 1324, n. 3. 33 
We therefore conclude that the public interest will most 
frequently be advanced if defrauded tippees are permitted to 
bring suit and to expose illegal practices by corporate in-
siders and broker-dealers to full public view for appropriate 
sanctions. As the Ninth Circuit emphasized in this case, 
there is no warrant to giving corporate insiders and broker-
dealers "a license to defraud the investing public with little 
fear of prosecution." I d. , at 1323. 
Affirmed. 
38 The SEC also argues that courts should deter tippees in cases such as 
this by limiting potential recovery to out-of-pocket losses. The courts 
below did not address this issue, and we express no views on the proper 
measure of relief. Cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S. , at 140. 
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